Monthly Archives: February 2013

Debian and Ubuntu packages for sbsigntools and efitools built

I got a lot of complaints about the lack of Debian or Ubuntu packages.  Apparently alien doesn’t work all that well, and some of the packages (like libc) are too new anyway on openSUSE.  So I finally figured out how to get OBS to build debian packages.  You can find them here:

http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:/jejb1:/UEFI/

I should note that don’t have an Ubuntu system, so the Ubuntu debs are untested.  The Debian packages work on my wheezy and testing systems.  In spite of the directory name, I severely doubt they’ll work properly on Debian 6.0: the openssl on that platform is too old, so I had to construct a special one just to get it to build.

If you want to keep them up to date, add this line to /etc/apt/sources

deb http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:/jejb1:/UEFI/Debian_6.0/ ./

And also add the repository key with apt-key add

Owning your Windows 8 UEFI Platform

Even if you only ever plan to run Windows or stock distributions of Linux that already have secure boot support, I’d encourage everybody who has a new UEFI secure boot platform to take ownership of it.  The way you do this is by installing your own Platform Key.  Once you have done this, you can use key database maintenance tools like keytool to edit all the keys on the Platform and move the platform programmatically from Setup Mode to User Mode and back again.  This blog post describes how you go about doing this.

First Save the Variables

The first thing to do is to install and run KeyTool either directly (the platform must have secure boot turned off, because keytool is unsigned) or via the mini USB image and save all the current secure variable keys (select the ‘Save Keys’ option from the top level menu).  This will save the contents of each variable as a single esl (EFI Signature List) file, so you should end up with three files: PK.esl, KEK.esl and db.esl.  These files can later be used to restore the contents if something goes wrong in the updates (and because some platforms put you into setup mode by erasing the contents of all the secure variables), so save them in a safe place.

Use the UEFI Menus to remove the Platform Key

This is the step that it’s impossible to be precise about.  Every UEFI platform seems to be different in how you do this.  The Linux Foundation hosts a web page collecting the information but so far it only has the Intel Tunnel Mountain system on it, but if you work it out for your platform, leave me a comment describing what you did and I’ll add it to the LF page.

The most common way to get a UEFI system to display the UEFI menus is to press ESC as it boots up.

Create your own Platform Key

If you rpm installed efitools, it will automatically have created a Platform Key for you in /usr/share/efitools/keys, plus all of the PK.auth and noPK.auth files.

A platform key may be self signed, but doesn’t have to be (I’m using one signed with my root certificate). However, assuming you want to create a self-signed platform key manually, here are the steps: The standard command for doing this with openssl is

openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj “/CN=<my CN text>/” -keyout PK.key -out PK.crt -days 3650 -nodes -sha256

None of the parameters for the key (Like the Common Name) matters, so you can replace <my CN text> with anything you like (mine says ‘James Bottomley Platform Key 2013′) you can also add other X509 well known objects like your address.  Once you have the two files PK.crt and PK.key, you need to save them in a safe location (PK.key is the one to guard since it’s your private key).

Next, create an EFI Signature List file with the public key in (this and the next steps require that you have either installed the efitools rpm or compiled the unix commands from efitools.git and installed them on your system)

cert-to-efi-sig-list -g <my random guid> PK.crt PK.esl

where <my random guid> is any random GUID you choose.  You also need to create an empty noPK.esl file which can be used to remove the platform key again

> noPK.esl

(do an ls -l on it to make sure it has zero size).

Now you create the signed update files (called .auth files)

sign-efi-sig-list -k PK.key -c PK.crt PK PK.esl PK.auth

sign-efi-sig-list -k PK.key -c PK.crt PK noPK.esl noPK.auth

copy the two .auth files to your USB key and you should now be able to use KeyTool to insert them into where the platform key is.  Go to ‘Edit Keys’, select the ‘The Platform Key (PK)’ and then ‘Replace Keys(s)’.  Navigate the file Chooser to your PK.auth file and you now are the platform Owner.  Press ESC to go to the top level menu and it should tell you the platform is in User Mode and Secure Boot is enabled.  Now verify you can move back to Setup Mode by going to ‘Edit Keys’, ‘The Platform Key (PK)’ and this time selecting the first entry (showing the GUID you chose for your platform key) and then ‘Delete with .auth file’.  This time navigate to noPK.auth and select it.  The platform key should now be gone and when you ESC to the top menu it will tell you you are in Setup Mode.  You now own your own platform and can move easily between setup and user modes.

Replace or Edit the rest of the Keys

Now you own your own platform, restoring or replacing the current platform keys is easy.  Where you saved the original keys, you should have a KEK.esl and a db.esl file.  If you find that KEK and db are blank, you can restore them with this file, simply place the platform into Setup Mode, go to ‘Edit Keys’, ‘The Key Exchange Key Database (KEK)’ and ‘Replace Key(s)’ and finally navigate to the KEK.esl file you saved.  You can also do the same thing with db.esl

Now your platform should be back to its original condition except that you own the Platform Key and can decide easily to flip it into Setup Mode.  Once in setup mode, you can edit the actual keys.  One thing you can do is create your own signature key (using the method above for PK) and place it into db.  You could also (assuming you never plan to boot windows) delete all the microsoft keys from the system.  Beware if you decide to do this that some of your UEFI drivers may be signed by microsoft keys, and removing them all may limit the functionality of your UEFI platform.  Additionally, any UEFI update to your system is also likely to come signed with the microsoft keys, however, in this case you can put the Microsoft keys back before doing the update.

If pieces of your UEFI system do need to be signed, it might be possible to extract them and sign them with your key instead of Microsoft’s, but I haven’t yet found a system that needs this, so I don’t really have much of an idea how to do it.

Remember to move your platform back to User Mode to enable secure boot before you exit KeyTool.

Linux Foundation Secure Boot System Released

As promised, here is the Linux Foundation UEFI secure boot system.  This was actually released to us by Microsoft on Wednesday 6 February, but with travel, conferences and meetings I didn’t really get time to validate it all until today.  The files are here

I’ve also put together a mini-USB image that is bootable (just dd it on to any USB key; the image is gpt partitioned, so use the whole disk device).  It has an EFI shell where the kernel should be and uses gummiboot to load.  You can find it here (md5sum 7971231d133e41dd667a184c255b599f).

To use the mini-USB image, you have to enroll the hashes for loader.efi (in the \EFI\BOOT directory; actually gummiboot) as well as shell.efi (in the top level directory).  It also includes a copy of KeyTool.efi which you have to enrol the hash of to run as well.

What Happened to KeyTool.efi?

Originally this was going to be part of our signed release kit.  However, during testing Microsoft discovered that because of a bug in one of the UEFI platforms, it could be used to remove the platform key programmatically, which would rather subvert the UEFI security system.  Until we can resolve this (we’ve now got the particular vendor in the loop), they declined to sign KeyTool.efi although you can, of course, authorize it by hash in the MOK variables if you want to run it.

Let me know how this goes because I’m very interested to gather feedback about what works and what doesn’t work.  In particular, there’s a worry that the security protocol override might not work on some platforms, so I particularly want to know if it doesn’t work for you.

LCA2013 and Rearchitecting Secure Boot

I’ve been quiet for a while, so it’s time to give an update about what’s happening with the Linux Foundation secure boot loader (Especially as this has recently been presented at LCA2013 [slides]).

The gist of the problem is that GregKH discovered in early December that the proposed Pre-BootLoader wouldn’t work in its current form with Gummiboot.  This was a bit disheartening because it meant that it didn’t fulfill the Linux Foundation mission of enabling all bootloaders.  On investigation, the reason was simple: Gummiboot was created to demonstrate you could make a small and simple bootloader that takes advantage of all the services available in the UEFI platform instead of being the massive link loader that things like grub are.  Unfortunately this means that it boots kernels using BootServices->LoadImage(), which means that the kernel to be booted is run through the UEFI platform secure boot checks.  Originally Pre-BootLoader, like shim, was written to use PE/Coff link loading to defeat the secure boot checks.  Unfortunately, this means that something run by the Pre-BootLoader must also use link loading to defeat the secure boot checks on anything it wants to load and thus, Gummiboot, which is deliberately not a link loader, won’t work under this scheme.

So time for a re-architecture and a re-write:  The problem has now gone from being how do we create a Microsoft signed link loader that obeys their policies to how do we enable all children of the bootloader to use BootServices->LoadImage() in a way that obeys their policies.  Fortunately, there is a way to intercept the UEFI platform signing infrastructure by installing your own security architecture protocol (See the Platform Initialization spec Volume 2 section 12.9).  Unfortunately, the PI Spec isn’t actually part of the UEFI specification, but fortunately it is implemented by every Windows 8 system that I can find.  The new architecture now Intercepts this protocol and adds its own security check.  However, there’s a second problem: While we’re in the security architecture protocol callback, we don’t necessarily own the screen of the UEFI system, making it completely impossible to do a present user test for authorising the running of the bnary.  Fortunately, there does exist a non interactive way of doing this and that’s the SUSE MOK mechanism.  Thus, the Linux Foundation Pre-BootLoader has now evolved to use the standard MOK variables to store hashes of authorized binaries.

The upshot of all of this is you can now use Pre-BootLoader with Gummiboot (as demoed at LCA2013).  To boot, you have to add two hashes: one for Gummiboot itself and one for the kernel you’re booting, but actually this is a good thing because now you have a single security policy controlling all of your boot sequence.  Gummiboot itself has also been patched to recognise a failure due to secure boot and pop up a helpful message telling you which hash to enrol.

I’ll be doing a separate post explaining how the new architecture works (or you can read the slides), but I thought I’d better explain what’s been going on for the last month.